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Articles
How to Regulate Legal Services to
Promote Access, Innovation, and the
Quality of Lawyering
Gillian K. Hadfield* and Deborah L. Rhode**
Scholars and critics have for decades advocated change in the professional regulation of
legal services markets in order to solve the ever-widening gap in access to justice. One of
the central obstacles to change has been concern about the impact of opening legal
markets to new practitioners and business models on central professional values such as
competence, loyalty, and independence. This Article argues that good regulatory solutions
are available to ensure that more open and flexible professional models—ones that allow
the practice of law by alternative providers and business structures—deliver high quality,
lower cost, greater innovation, and more access to those currently excluded from our
justice systems. Part I explores the rationale for regulating the legal services market, and
argues that oversight structures should be more responsive to differences in the risks that
consumers face in various legal contexts. Part II surveys regulatory options: prescriptive,
performance based, management based, and competitive or meta-regulation. Part III
reviews the promising strategies that the United Kingdom has recently pioneered to
promote access, innovation, and quality. Part IV analyzes regulatory options for the
United States and the applicability of U.K. approaches in this country. Attention also
focuses on the contributions and limitations of Washington’s recent program to recognize
limited license legal technicians. We conclude with proposals for more effective national
regulatory models.

* Gillian K. Hadfield is the Richard and Antoinette Schamoi Kirtland Professor of Law and
Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California.
** Deborah L. Rhode is the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center
on the Legal Profession at Stanford University.

[1191]

G - Hadfield_Rhode_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

1192

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/19/2016 12:09 PM

[Vol. 67:1191

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................. 1192
I. Why Regulate Legal Services? ........................................................ 1196
II. What Are the Regulatory Options? .............................................. 1200
III. How the United Kingdom Regulates to Promote Access,
Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering ............................... 1203
IV. American Options ............................................................................. 1214
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1223
Introduction
The case has been made for decades: our existing approaches to
regulating the American legal profession increase costs, decrease access,
stifle innovation, and do little to protect the interests of those who need
1
or use legal services. Ordinary Americans routinely manage complicated
2
legal circumstances with little or no professional help; the great majority
of lawyers’ work is done for large corporate clients, and the trend has
3
only worsened in the last decades. The number of people showing up in
court without legal assistance to manage problems with housing, family,
domestic violence, consumer credit, and other challenges continues to
mount—in a recent New York study, the percentage of unrepresented

1. Benjamin H. Barton, Glass Half Full: The Decline and Rebirth of the Legal
Profession (2015); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988); Deborah L.
Rhode, Access to Justice (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, The Trouble with Lawyers (2015)
[hereinafter Rhode, The Trouble with Lawyers]; Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate
Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (1981); Barlow F. Chistensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:
Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—Or Even Good Sense?, 5 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 159
(1980); Gerard K. Clark, Monopoly Power in Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of the ABA’s Role
in the Regulation of the American Legal Profession, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1009 (2012); Stephen
Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules,
46 Ohio St. L.J. 243 (1985); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice
Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 43 (2014) [hereinafter Hadfield,
The Cost of Law]; Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts
Regulate Legal Markets, 143 Daedelus 1 (2014); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The
Growing Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1689 (2008)
[hereinafter Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation]; James E. Moliterno, Crisis Regulation, 2012
Mich. St. L. Rev. 307; Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to
Nonlawyer Practice, 1 J. Inst. Study Legal Ethics 197 (1996); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 61 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly];
Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L.
Rev. 689 (1981); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29 (1978); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 799 (1992).
2. See Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in the Law Thick World: The Legal Resource
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, in Beyond Elite Law: Access to Civil Justice in America 21
(Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds. 2016).
3. John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar (2005).
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4

litigants topped ninety-five percent in several routine categories. A lack
of legal assistance with municipal and traffic violations has played no
small part in the abusive use of arrest warrants and fines in poor
5
communities. Even in criminal matters where the Gideon right to
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the inadequacy of legal help is
6
staggering.
The traditional response of the organized bar to the crisis in access
to justice has been to promote increased funding for legal aid, increased
pro bono obligations on practicing attorneys, and the creation of a
government-funded “civil Gideon” right to counsel in some civil matters.
But it is also painfully clear that these responses are wholly inadequate.
Providing even one hour of attorney time to every American household
7
facing a legal problem would cost on the order of $40 billion. Total
expenditures on legal aid, counting both public and private sources, are
8
now just 3.5% of that amount. Fewer than two percent of all American
lawyers work in legal aid or public defender jobs and pro bono work
9
accounts for less than two percent of legal effort. Providing just one
hour of pro bono assistance per problem to households facing legal
difficulties would require over 200 hours of pro bono work per year by
10
every licensed attorney in the country. No amount of volunteerism,
ethical exhortation, or political pressure for increased taxation to fund
legal services can ever fill the gap.
The principal obstacle to increasing access to legal assistance is the
cost of the business model in which legal services have conventionally
11
been available to ordinary consumers. That model relies on individual

4. Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Servs. in N.Y., Report to the Chief Judge of
the State of New York 1 (2010).
5. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (2015).
6. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, GIDEON’s Broken
Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 7−14 (2004); Karen Houppert, Chasing
Gideon, The Elusive Quest for Poor People’s Justice 154 (2013); Rhode, The Trouble with
Lawyers, supra note 1, at 30−35; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316, 2319, 2321 (2013); Carol S.
Steiker, Gideon’s Problematic Promises, 143 Daedalus 51, 53 (2014).
7. This calculation is based on data in Hadfield & Heine, supra note 2. It uses a straight-line
average of the percentage of households reporting at least one legal problem in state surveys (sixtytwo percent), the average number of problems experienced by these households (three) and an
estimate of an hourly rate of $200.
8. Alan W. Houseman, CLASP, Civil Legal Aid in the United States: An Update for 2013
(2013).
9. An ABA survey calculated that licensed attorneys provide on average 42.8 hours of pro bono
services directly to people of limited means in 2012. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Pro Bono &
Pub. Serv., Supporting Justice III: A Report on the Pro Bono Work of America’s Lawyers 6
(2013). Assuming forty-eight forty-hour weeks of work for an average lawyer, this is a little over two
percent of annual legal effort.
10. See supra basis for calculation note 7.
11. Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 1, at 44.
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one-on-one lawyering, through traditional solo and small firm practices,
generally billed on an hourly basis. The model foregoes the cost-reducing
benefits of scale, branding, technology, and the ordinary efficiencies that
would come from having lawyers specialize in legal functions, while
others (software engineers, financial analysts, business managers,
12
marketing experts, and so on) specialize in all the other functions. Why
has the traditional model of legal service delivery not achieved greater
efficiencies and lower costs?
The American approach to professional regulation is not the only
answer, but it is clearly a major contributing factor. That approach is
expressed primarily in the expansive rules on unauthorized practice of
law and the restrictions on the corporate practice of law and fee sharing.
Under that approach, all (paid) legal help must be provided by holders of
an expensive graduate degree—the J.D.—who pass a state bar exam and
13
hold a valid license from a state bar association. Legal services must be
provided by a law firm that is owned, managed, and financed exclusively
14
by lawyers. Lawyers who are employees of other entities can offer legal
15
services only to their employer, not the public. Lawyers cannot enter
profit- or revenue-sharing contracts with providers of complementary
16
goods and services. These rules make the markets for legal services
among the most, if not the most, intrusively regulated in the modern
economy. Even the practice of medicine is far more openly organized,
17
particularly since the advent of health maintenance organizations.
The fierce preservation of a legal professional regulatory model first
adopted in the 1930s but substantially abandoned in other professions
rests on two driving forces. The first is sheer protectionism. As much as
we would like to deny that lawyers are using their special access to the
regulatory levers to protect themselves from competition by alternative
18
providers and business models, this is clearly part of the story.
Anticompetitive behavior is, of course, a temptation for any selfregulating profession, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently acknowledged

12. Id. at 49.
13. With limited exception now in Washington State, which we discuss infra Part IV.
14. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 5.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013). Washington, D.C. is
a limited exception. D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 5.4(b) (2016) (allowing nonlawyer financial
interest and managerial authority in law firm provided firm has as its sole purpose providing legal
services and lawyers are responsible for nonlawyer participants).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For a history of professional regulation in medicine, see James C. Robinson, The Corporate
Practice of Medicine: Competition and Innovation in Health Care (1999).
18. Rhode’s chronicles of these efforts span three decades. See Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly, supra note 1; Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the
Public: Rethinking Unauthorized Practice Enforcement, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2587 (2014); see also
Rhode, The Trouble with Lawyers, supra note 1, at 42−44, 88−90.
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in a landmark decision finding that regulatory boards that are controlled
by members of a profession are not exempted from application of the
19
antitrust laws in the absence of active supervision by the state.
The second impediment to new models for regulating legal services is
the sincere worry that changes to the doctrines prohibiting the corporate
practice of law and fee sharing and the relaxation of the boundaries of
the unauthorized practice rules will unleash a flood of shoddy, fraudulent,
and/or unethical behavior upon the public. Lawyers working for
corporations, it is feared, will defer to their shareholders and act in the
best interests of their employers rather than clients. In the absence of
unauthorized practice rules, many worry that innocent consumers could
be bilked out of thousands of dollars by scam artists with no legal expertise
to offer.
This apocalyptic scenario is of instrumental use to those who want
to cast protectionist motives in high-minded rhetoric. But the scenario
also, we think, haunts those in the profession who recognize the need for
change to promote access but who worry that the unintended consequences
will take us in the wrong direction. And it is to this latter group that we
address our analysis in this Article. Our aim is to demonstrate that there
are a number of standard and well-developed regulatory approaches
available to give comfort to this audience. (And, we would like to think,
take the wind out of protectionist sails.) Indeed, the regulatory models
we explore would not only release the potential for innovation and costreducing efficiencies in the practice of law, they would improve protections
for consumers. That is a win-win for the profession, as well as for access to
justice.
Our Article is organized as follows: We first explore the reasons for
regulating the provision of legal services—what are the risks that any
approach to regulation seeks to mitigate? We consider here what other
mechanisms might operate, even in the absence of specialized regulation,
to serve the interests of the consumers of legal services. Against that
backdrop, we can better appreciate when and where regulation can improve
upon the unregulated marketplace. Next we survey various regulatory
approaches. This overview helps to put the problem of regulating legal
services in context, as an instance of the more general problem of
regulation. We then explore in more detail how the major challenges that
worry the professionincluding allowing nonlawyer controlled entities
to supply legal services, allowing lawyers to share profits or revenues
with nonlawyers, and allowing practice by lay specialistsare managed
in the United Kingdom. Finally, we propose some concrete options for
adapting these regulatory approaches to the American environment.

19. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015).
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I. Why Regulate Legal Services?
Although many Americans speak as though markets are natural
objects on which government regulation is imposed, all markets are
regulated markets. Standard economy-wide regulation shapes any
market for services through contract and fraud law, public policy limits,
antidiscrimination legislation, truth-in-advertising oversight, health and
safety protections, and antitrust rules. In an industry regulated by just
these basic regulations, the principal protection for consumers is marketbased. Those who supply poor services do not get repeat business. Low
quality providers do not grow their client base through a good reputation.
Consumers protect themselves by researching their options, choosing
known and trusted brands, trying out the service with a small or lowstakes job or a probationary or free trial period, monitoring performance
closely, or by switching providers.
Markets can also produce their own regulatory rules through market
mechanisms. Where consumers face some difficulty in assessing quality, for
example, voluntary groups can form to certify performance. Certifierssuch
as professional groups, educators, or quality watchdogscan establish
standards of education or practice that providers have to meet to earn the
certifier’s seal of approval or the right to advertise that they possess
certification.
Government-led regulatory frameworks buttress this market-based
protection by providing consumers with legal oversight and state-supplied
sanctions. The Federal Trade Commission and state departments of
consumer affairs, for example, monitor and take action against misleading
advertising. State and federal antitrust authorities can investigate, enjoin,
and sanction anticompetitive conduct. Consumers can sue, individually
and in class actions, for violations of many of these and other statutory
rules, as well as contract and tort laws.
The more extensive regulation of traditional professional services
such as law, medicine, dentistry, architecture, and engineering rests on
concerns about the potential failure or attenuation of these basic market,
legal, and regulatory mechanisms. These professional services are
characterized by three key features. First, the service requires, at least in
some core cases, substantial specialization and expertise on the part of
the provider. Second, it can often be difficult if not impossible for the
consumer of the services to judge the quality of the services provided,
even after the fact; the services comprise what economists call a
“credence good.” Third, the stakes are often substantial; the consumer is
relying to a significant degree on the quality and fidelity of the service
provider. If people’s health or liberty or large portions of their wealth are
at issue and they have to trust their well being to the discretion and
judgment of a service provider, the case is easier to make for greater
regulation.
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Note that by “quality” here we mean many of the features that
professionals think of as ethical attributes of service provision. So quality
in lawyering means not only the competence of the service, but also the
factors that lawyers allow to influence their performance. Do the lawyers
choose strategies that are in clients’ best interest? Do the lawyers avoid
conflicts of interest? Do the lawyers maintain the confidentiality of client
information? Do the lawyers keep the client properly informed and do
the lawyers remain adequately apprised of their clients’ changing needs
and circumstances?
Quality also includes attributes that service professionals sometimes
do not think of as part of their job or as either legitimate or important
expectations on the part of consumers. Other industries understand these
attributes in terms of customer service. Are phone calls returned
promptly and reliably? Does the professional convey respect and
empathy for the client? Does the provider make it easy for the client to
understand her situation, make choices, and implement solutions? Does
the provider treat the client’s time as valuable? Does the provider listen
to what the client is saying? Is the provider an agreeable person to work
with? Are the provider’s procedures and modes of communication
intuitive, easy to navigate, and appealing?
Table 1 gives a snapshot of failures of quality in legal services. It
shows the frequency of different types of errors in claims made against
20
legal malpractice insurance in Missouri from 2005 through 2014. It is
clear that many failures in legal practice involve attributes of service
delivery other than legal knowledge or judgment.

20. For an in-depth review of evidence of malpractice, see Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar,
When the Lawyer Screws up: A Portrait of Legal Malpractice Claims and Their Resolution (June
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Duke University Law School).
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Table 1: Missouri Malpractice Claims 2005−2014

21

Number of
Closed Claims

Number of
Paid Claims

Average Paid
per Claim

Total Paid

Failure to ascertain
deadline correctly

301

84

$131,962

$11,084,808

Planning or strategy
error

261

73

$241,574

$17,634,902

Failure to know or
properly apply law

171

53

$96,574

$5,118,422

Procrastination/lack of
follow up

129

34

$230,188

$7,826,392

Inadequate investigation

122

36

$120,483

$4,337,388

Failure to follow
client’s instructions

111

17

$211,126

$3,589,142

Failure to file
documents
(no deadline)

102

26

$70,962

$1,845,012

Failure to react to
calendar

96

40

$61,955

$2,478,200

Malicious prosecution
of abuse of process

85

14

$23,774

$332,836

Failure to calendar
properly

75

41

$67,707

$2,775,987

Fraud

74

14

$57,871

$810,194

Conflict of interest

62

15

$239,342

$3,590,130

Clerical error

50

13

$24,742

$321,646

Failure to obtain
clients’ consent

47

8

$25,885

$207,080

Error or Omission

Violation of civil rights

39

4

$101,250

$405,000

Math calculation error

21

7

$52,094

$364,658

Improper withdrawal
from representation

19

5

$54,342

$271,710

Error in public record
search

16

6

$68,768

$412,608

Libel or slander

14

1

$15,000

$15,000

Failure to anticipate
tax consequences

12

3

$455,000

$1,365,000

Lost file, document or
evidence

5

1

$17,500

$17,500

549

68

$72,266

$4,914,088

Other

21. Mo. Dep’t of Ins., Fin. Insts. & Prof’l Registration, 2014 Missouri Legal Malpractice
Insurance Report 41 (2015).
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A principal reason to regulate professional services is to raise the
likelihood that consumers of legal services receive the quality that they
(explicitly or implicitly) expect in those settings in which the ordinary
regulated market does not adequately police quality. These are settings
in which consumers (patients, clients, constituents) put themselves in a
professional’s hands and are not in a position to second-guess the choices
the professional makes and where the failure to live up to the obligation
that trust creates carries potentially serious consequences. They are
settings in which we do not expect that reputation alone will police
conduct and where it is expensive to pursue a breach of contract or tort
claim given the difficulty a consumer will face in identifying and then
proving professional failures. They are settings in which the problems go
beyond those covered by standard marketplace regulations such as
restrictions on fraud, advertising or anticompetitive conduct.
A second reason to regulate professional services beyond ordinary
marketplace regulation arises from society’s interest in the provision of
competent and ethical behavior. There may be externalities arising from
the service provided to a particular individual. Fidelity to the rule of law
promotes public confidence in the legal system and supports compliance
with legal rules. In high stake matters, the public cares about how
members of the community are treated. Society and third parties suffer
from inadequate representation of those facing deportation, eviction, or
loss of child custody.
However, the risk that the market and basic marketplace regulation
will not adequately police quality is not the same across all quality
attributes, consumers, and cases. Consumers can judge some attributes of
service reasonably well. In those cases, with sufficient scale and some
means for consumers to share experiences (online reviews, for example),
providers can develop reputations and trusted brands. Many elements of
customer service are in this category, such as returning phone calls, treating
clients with respect, keeping clients informed, and providing easy-tonavigate materials and websites. Other quality dimensions can be judged
by individuals who lack specific legal expertise and so can also contribute
to reputations as well as decisions to pursue ordinary remedies for
breach of contract or negligence. Many of these show up on the list of
malpractice errors in Table 1, including: failing to ascertain a deadline
correctly, procrastination, failing to file documents, failing to calendar
properly or to react to a calendar entry, making a clerical error, failing to
obtain consent, making an error in a math calculation, making an error in
a public record search, and losing files or documents. These are errors
arising from poor organization and process management—a type of error
that larger organizations with sufficient scale and resources to develop
and implement systematic protocols can avoid more easily than
individuals or small firms.
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In other cases, the stakes are relatively low and hence the need for
costly specialized regulation is harder to justify. Courts and legislatures
make judgments all the time about the relative importance of the stakes
in a case and the consequences of short-changing the quality of legal
attention they receive. They do this when they decide, for example, to
prohibit the use of lawyers in small claims cases. Cases involving small
dollar amounts often (but not always) are relatively low stakes for the
parties involved.
Not all consumers need the same kind of protection. Consumers with
substantial market power need less protection than lone individuals—the
former have a good threat against poor quality providers. Those who are
repeat purchasers are in a better position to protect themselves through
choice, monitoring, and the threat to switch providers than one-time
purchasers. Experienced or sophisticated customers, and those purchasing a
large volume of services, have an incentive to invest in research about
service options and can judge quality better than inexperienced, vulnerable,
or small-volume purchasers.
Finally, some quality problems are just less frequent than others.
The likelihood of a math error in online tax preparation software, for
example, is very low. The potential for missing the opportunity to reduce
estate taxes is limited to the tiny number of estates that exceed the multimillion dollar thresholds for estate taxes. The likelihood of any error is
lower in cases that arise infrequently than in those that are commonplace.
One of the factors leading deadline errors to top the list of Missouri
malpractice claims (in addition to the ease of proof) is the sheer number
of situations in which there is a deadline to be met; errors in public
record searches might be much less frequent simply because there are
many fewer searches of this kind that lawyers have to conduct compared
to the number of deadlines of which lawyers have to keep track.
In short, attention to the differences in risks to quality in the legal
services industry is a critical consideration in intelligent regulation. And, as
subsequent discussion suggests, it is systematically ignored by conventional
approaches to regulation of the legal profession. That means that
providers of law-related services bear the costs of regulation across the
board, despite the fact that in many cases the risks are low and can be
handled well by market incentives and ordinary marketplace regulation.
II. What Are the Regulatory Options?
There are four principal methods for regulating services when the
22
incentives created by ordinary marketplace regulation are inadequate.
The traditional approach to regulation is prescriptive, sometimes called
22. For an overview, see Peter J. May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 Reg. &
Governance 8 (2007).
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command-and-control. Prescriptive regulation supplies specific and
sometimes highly detailed rules about the training and qualifications that
providers must possess, the practices they must follow, and/or the
business models and techniques they must use to deliver the service.
Violations of these rules can trigger fines or criminal sanctions. In
addition, prescriptive rules can serve as prerequisites for a valid license
to supply the service. Rule violations can then lead to license revocation.
By contrast, the second approach, performance- or outcomes-based
regulation specifies results that a provider has to achieve, but does not
specify how the provider has to achieve those results. Tort law is a
familiar form of performance-based regulation. As noted earlier, tort law
exposes service providers to damages if their services end up causing
someone harm—liability might be strict or only attach if the harm was
due to professional negligence. Unlike a prescriptive regulatory regime,
however, tort law does not specify upfront what specific behaviors or
procedures a professional has to follow; it is only after performance has
fallen short of some level that certain behaviors give rise to remedies.
More generally, performance-based regulation is implemented by
specialized regulators, who may audit performance and/or rely on
complaints from consumers, to identify when required outcomes have
not been achieved.
Both prescriptive regulation and performance-based regulation aim
at the same target: ensuring that the quality of service delivered meets
certain standards. The principal difference, however, is that with
prescriptive regulation the regulator is relying on a prediction that the
training and practice requirements specified in the regulations will
produce the desired outcomes. With performance-based regulation, the
regulator only targets behaviors that failed to produce desired outcomes
in fact. Prescriptive regulation thus can miss the mark in two ways:
(1) regulation might be ineffective, meaning that undesirable outcomes
persist despite the requirements; and (2) regulation might be excessive,
meaning that requirements could be relaxed or eliminated with no ill
effects on outcomes. On the other hand, validated prescriptive
regulations—that is, those for which there is good empirical evidence of a
reasonably tight nexus between the rules and the likelihood of bad
results—might be superior to performance-based regulations. This could
happen, for example, if regulators are better at figuring out what
practices reduce bad outcomes than practitioners are. For this reason,
performance-based regulation is often preferable when there are
multiple and possibly complex ways of potentially reducing undesirable
results, when there is substantial uncertainty about the relationship
between training, practices, and outcomes, and when practitioners are in
a better position to innovate than state regulators.
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Sometimes uncertainty extends even to the determination of what
23
appropriate performance standards should be. A third approach,
systems- or management-based regulation, has developed in response to
24
this challenge. Under this approach, regulators specify neither required
practices nor required outcomes. Instead, they require regulated providers
to engage in a process of reviewing their practices and outcomes and to
develop internal procedures for achieving goals they identify through this
process. The procedures and goals are then approved and the regulator
monitors compliance with the plan.
A fourth approach, one that is relatively novel in the regulatory
25
world, is meta-regulation or competitive regulation. Under this approach,
government regulators regulate regulators. That is, the particular rules and
processes that are imposed on providers are developed by possibly
private, possibly multiple, third-party regulators. Those regulators are in
turn subject to oversight by the state. The government requires providers
to specify a regulator from among a set of approved regulators. An
advantage of this approach is that private regulatory entities can specialize
in the tools and techniques of regulation, achieving even a greater level
of innovation and investment in regulatory design than is possible with
management-based regulation. A key challenge of this approach is ensuring
that any entity to which the state has effectively delegated regulatory
oversight authority achieves results consistent with the state’s regulatory
goals and is not captured by the regulated entities. As we discuss below,
this approach to regulation is playing a central role in the United
Kingdom and thus can inform discussion of reforms in American
professional regulation to promote access, reduce costs, and increase the
quality of lawyering.
A regulatory regime could combine elements from several of these
approaches. Providers might have to satisfy certain educational
requirements in order to obtain a license, for example. Once licensed, they
might then be subject to prescriptive, performance-based, or managementbased regulation, or a combination of these three—with some performance
standards and practices imposed by the state, for example, and others

23. For a discussion of this problem, see Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation:
Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 705, 708
(2003).
24. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691, 691−93 (2003). This approach to
regulation also goes under the labels of enforced self-regulation, principles-based regulation, process
regulation, and meta-regulation. See Sharon Gilad, It Runs in the Family: Meta-Regulation and Its
Siblings, 4 Reg. & Governance 485 (2010).
25. Gillian K. Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law and How to
Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy (forthcoming Oct. 2016); Christine Parker, The Open
Corporation (2002). Parker’s use of the term “meta-regulation” is expansive and includes what we
called management-based regulation, above—where the “regulator” is the self-regulating provider.
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developed by the regulated entity. The regulator that directly oversees
the provider might be the state itself, or an entity such as a professional
association that is responsible to the state.
There are several other elements that figure in the design of
regulation. Regulators can choose among different methods to identify
regulatory violations. They can be reactive—responding to complaints
from consumers or others, or proactive—engaging in regular auditing of
providers and their practices. They can enforce regulations by revoking,
suspending, or placing conditions on a license; publishing a violator’s
name; requiring remediation of inadequate service; and/or imposing
fines. They can be enforced administratively through the creation of
criminal liability for violations and/or through the creation of a private
right of action that allows a consumer who has suffered a loss to sue,
individually or as a member of class, for damages or injunctive relief.
They can regulate individual providers and/or the entities through which
providers supply their services. They can require providers to take out
insurance and/or establish compensation funds to cover losses when
quality fails to meet required standards. Last, they can choose to finance
the cost of regulation in multiple ways: through general tax revenues,
transaction-specific sales taxes, licensing fees, professional dues, and/or
revenues generated from fines.
The design of a regulatory system has to take into account all of
these considerations, and then assess the actual benefits of a particular
approach as against the costs. On both dimensions, regulation of the
American legal profession is seriously misaligned with the objective of
ensuring that consumers have affordable access to quality legal help as
they navigate a complex legal environment. As we, and many others,
have noted elsewhere, existing professional regulation focuses almost
exclusively on ensuring particular quality attributes—loyalty, independence,
and confidentiality—for those few clients able to afford to hire lawyers at
26
current rates under current business models. Even for these clients, the
protections available come at too high a cost, inhibiting innovation of
27
lower cost and higher quality approaches to solving legal problems.
III. How the United Kingdom Regulates to Promote Access,
Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering
Many current discussions of the need for reform of the American
approach to legal professional regulation eventually circle around to the
United Kingdom’s alternative model. This model diverges substantially
from the modern American approach, and it is because of the ways in
which it diverges that it succeeds in promoting access and innovation

26. Rhode, The Trouble with Lawyers, supra note 1, at 30−52, 98−102.
27. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation, supra note 1, at 1725−26.

G - Hadfield_Rhode_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

1204

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/19/2016 12:09 PM

[Vol. 67:1191

without sacrificing the quality of lawyering. In this Part, after a quick
summary of the American approach, we show how the U.K. model
achieves these goals.
The modern American approach to regulating the practice of law
dates to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, led primarily
by deliberate efforts in the American Bar Association to regulate
admissions and practice and to wrest control from state legislatures and
28
lodge it in state supreme courts. The resulting scheme, however, went
far beyond the common law history of granting courts the power to
determine who could appear before them. In effect, state courts
delegated authority to bar associations to set rules (most of which
followed the lead of the ABA Model Rules) that encompass all aspects
of the practice of law. The power of these rules to exclude practitioners
who did not meet bar standards or adhere to bar practice requirements
(such as prohibitions on the corporate practice of law and fee-sharing)
was often buttressed with legislation making it illegal to practice law
29
without the authorization of the state supreme court. As many have
recounted, the boundaries of this regulatory authority have always been
expansive, with the definition of what constitutes the “practice of law”
stretching to incorporate effectively everything done by lawyers: legal
advice, drafting, negotiation, representation, and support in dispute
30
resolution processes. Moreover, state supreme courts have claimed an
inherent authority, grounded in the constitutional separation of powers,
31
to regulate the legal profession in all of its activities.
The British approach to regulation of the legal profession has never
followed the same path. From the earliest days, the United Kingdom has
always had multiple legal professions—originally barristers, solicitors,
32
attorneys, and scriveners. At no time has the provision of legal advice
or the drafting of documents (other than those required to participate in
a lawsuit or convey real estate) been subject to regulation. And since the
passage of the Legal Services Act (“LSA”) of 2007, the regulatory
approach in the United Kingdom has diverged even further from the
American model.

28. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work (1998); see
also Laurel Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—The Roots of the
Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 Cal. W. L. Rev. 65 (2009).
29. Rigertas, supra note 28, at 118−19.
30. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation, supra note 1, at 1707.
31. Rigertas, supra note 28, at 69.
32. See generally Michael Burrage, From a Gentlemen’s to a Public Profession: Status and Politics
in the History of English Solicitors, 3 Int’l J. Legal Prof. 45 (1996) (examining the professional
formation of English solicitors to understand its contemporary transformation).

G - Hadfield_Rhode_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

June 2016]

6/19/2016 12:09 PM

HOW TO REGULATE LEGAL SERVICES

1205

The current regulatory approach of the LSA begins with designation
of regulatory objectives. These regulatory objectives are:
(a) protecting and promoting the public interest;
(b) supporting the constitutional principle of the rules of law;
(c) improving access to justice;
(d) protecting and promoting the interests of consumers;
(e) promoting competition in the provision of regulated services . . .;
(f) encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal
profession;
(g) increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and
duties;
(h) promoting and maintaining adherence to the professional
33
principles.

The professional principles mentioned in (h) are set out in the Act:
(a) that authorised persons should act with independence and integrity,
(b) that authorised persons should maintain proper standards of work,
(c) that authorised persons should act in the best interests of clients,
(d) that persons who exercise before any court a right of audience, or
conduct litigation in relation to proceedings in any court, by virtue of
being authorised persons should comply with their duty to the court to
act with independence in the interests of justice, and
34
(e) that the affairs of clients should be kept confidential.

Thus, the U.K. professional principles thus track all of the core
values of the legal profession as articulated by the ABA—with the
important difference that the LSA adds a commitment to promoting
competition and does not elevate as a goal in itself the preservation of a
35
single (self-regulated) profession.

33. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 1(1) (Eng. & Wales).
34. Id. § 1(3).
35. The maintenance of a single profession of law was added to the list of core values of the
profession in the ABA House of Delegates’ resolution in 2000 rejecting recommendations from the
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to allow lawyers to share fees with nonlawyer
professionals. Am. Bar Ass’n Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Resolution of House of Delegates
Adopting Revised Recommendation 10f (2000). As discussed in Hadfield, Legal Barriers to
Innovation, supra note 1, at 1692−94, this suggests lawyers have an ethical duty, comparable to their
duty to protect the public, to make sure that only traditionally licensed lawyers provide any form of
legal services. This minimizes, rather than promotes, competition.

G - Hadfield_Rhode_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

1206

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/19/2016 12:09 PM

[Vol. 67:1191

The strategy of the LSA is to designate particular instances of legal
work as reserved activities and then to require that those activities only be
performed by “authorized persons.” These reserved activities are:
(a) the exercise of a right of audience;
(b) the conduct of litigation;
(c) reserved instrument activities;
(d) probate activities;
(e) notarial activities;
36
(f) the administration of oaths.

This is where we see a major difference between the British and
American approaches. The American bar associations and state courts
effectively open the practice of law to bar-licensed attorneys only while
reserving the right to add to the category of the practice of law down the
line. This approach forces alternative providers to seek carve-outs for
things like document assembly, supplying blank contracts (real estate
agents), tax advice (accountants), non-profit assistance to immigrants in
some hearings, and appearances before some federal administrative
bodies such as the U.S. Tax Court, the Patent Office, and the Social
37
Security Administration. The U.K. approach, in contrast, carves out
specific activities for licensed lawyers, and leaves the residual open for
38
competition from alternative nonlawyer providers.
A second major difference is that the category of “authorized
person” in the United Kingdom includes multiple legal professions and
licenses. Currently in the United Kingdom there are nine different
professional licenses or designations for those performing reserved activities:
solicitor, barrister, legal executive, notary, licensed conveyancer, patent
39
attorney, trademark attorney, costs lawyer, and chartered accountant.

36. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 12(1) (Eng. & Wales). Reserved instrument activities refer to
transactions involving real and personal property (sales, long-term leases, liens, and so on) but do not
include wills, short-term leases, powers of attorney or stock transfers that do not involve a trust or
limitation on the transfer. See id. § 12(2).
37. See Kritzer, supra note 28, at 202−16.
38. The Legal Services Board estimated in 2015 that twenty to thirty percent of expenditures on
legal services are made to unregulated providers, noting that “this is permitted under the Legal
Services Act 2007, which provides that individuals or firms must only be authorised and regulated if
they wish to provide one of the six ‘reserved legal activities.’” Unregulated Legal Services Providers, Legal
Servs. Board, http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/Projects/Unregulated_Legal_Services_Providers/
index.htm (last visited May 29, 2016).
39. A Legal Executive is someone who has generally pursued a non-university training path to
practice and has worked under the supervision of a licensed provider for a number of years. Legal
Executives are able to engage in the same services as a solicitor or barrister under the Legal Services
Act 2007. A Costs Lawyer is a practitioner who focuses specifically on resolving disputes involving the
allocation of expenses under the British rule that allows a court to require a losing party to pay a
portion of the winning party’s legal fees and costs. See Approved Regulators, Legal Servs. Board,
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/can_we_help/approved_regulators/ (last visited May 29, 2016).
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Professionals practicing under these licenses have nonexclusive
authorization to perform particular reserved activities and hence there is
40
interprofessional competition. Barristers, solicitors, and legal executives
can perform all reserved activities with the exception of notarial
activities, which only notaries can perform. Notaries, however, can,
alongside licensed conveyancers, also engage in reserved instrument and
probate activities; neither can exercise a right of audience or conduct
litigation. Patent and trademark attorneys can appear in court, conduct
litigation, and engage in reserved instrument activities. Costs lawyers can
appear in court and conduct litigation. Chartered accountants can engage
in probate activities only; they are the only legal professionals who
cannot administer oaths.
Regulation of each of these professions is carried out by a different
approved regulator. The Law Society regulates solicitors and the Bar
Council regulates barristers, for example. Approval and oversight of
these front-line regulators is carried out by the Legal Services Board
(“LSB”), an independent administrative body that is accountable to
41
Parliament and operates out of the Ministry of Justice. With the
exception of the Chief Executive (who is appointed by the Board), Board
42
members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The Legal Services
43
Act requires the LSB to have a lay chair and a majority of lay members.
The Act also requires front-line regulators, which operate as trade
associations promoting the interests of their members, to establish
independent regulatory arms (the Solicitors Regulatory Authority and
44
the Bar Standards Board, for example). Under the authority of the Act,
the LSB has established internal governance rules requiring the
regulatory bodies set up by approved regulators to be governed by a board
with a nonlawyer chair and a majority composed of nonlawyer members.
This is an example of what we earlier called competitive or metaregulation: a legal practitioner who wishes to conduct litigation, for example,
can choose from which professional body authorized to regulate that
particular activity she wants to secure a license. This means that not only
are existing practitioners engaged in interprofessional competition across
dimensions such as cost and quality, so too are the front-line regulators
in competition in the design and implementation of their regulatory
requirements.

40. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 20, sch. 4 (Eng. & Wales).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2, sch. 1.
43. A layperson is defined as someone who has never been an authorized person with respect to a
reserved legal activity. Id. § 2, sch. 1. Committees and subcommittees of the Board must also have a
majority of lay members. Id. § 2, sch. 1, pt. 20(4).
44. Id. §§ 29, 30.
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Competition between regulators occurs under the umbrella of
45
oversight by the LSB, which must approve regulators’ rules and processes.
Ultimately, the LSB is responsible for ensuring that regulators are fostering
regulatory objectives. This involves reviewing, for example, proposed
rule changes, monitoring the performance of the approved regulators,
conducting research and investigation of the performance of legal
services markets, and making recommendations to the Lord Chancellor
about changes to the regulatory scheme implemented by the Legal
46
Services Act. In carrying out its activities, the LSB is required to consult
with the Lord Chief Justice (the head of the judiciary), the U.K. antitrust
authority (the Office of Fair Trade), and a Consumer Panel.
The U.K. scheme also provides for the licensing of entities. These
are known as alternative business structures (“ABS”), which supply an
alternative to the law firm through which lawyers have traditionally
offered their services. The LSB approves and oversees the bodies authorized
to license ABSs. There are five licensing authorities: the Solicitors
Regulatory Authority, the Bar Standards Board, the Council of Licensed
Conveyancers, the Institute for Chartered Accountants, and the
Intellectual Property Regulation Board (which regulates both patent and
trademark attorneys). Collectively, as of 2015, these five licensing
authorities had licensed over 800 entities, including solo practitioner
entities, law partnerships, for-profit corporations, entities owned by
unions and other non-profit organizations, and cooperatives. Most are
private, not publicly listed, companies and include such recognizable
names for Americans as Ernst & Young, LegalZoom, KPMG, and
47
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Slater & Gordon LLP—an Australian firm
with approximately twelve percent of the U.K. market in personal injury
48
law in 2015—is one of the few publicly traded companies on the list.
The regulation of ABSs is two-pronged: the entity is regulated and
the authorized persons within the entity are regulated. Both are subject
to losing their license or authorization to practice in the event of a breach
of the rules of a licensing authority (in the case of an entity) or an
approved regulator (in the case of an authorized person). The licensing
authority must approve anyone who holds a material or interest in an
49
ABS. Approval is based on a determination that the holding of the

45. Id. § 20, sch. 4.
46. This includes investigations to determine whether regulatory boards are operating
independently of the representative arm of an approved regulator.
47. Search for a Licensed Body (ABS), Solicitors Reg. Authority, http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/
firm-based-authorisation/abs/abs-search.page (last visited May 29, 2016).
48. See id.
49. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 89, sch. 13 (Eng. & Wales). In general a material interest
means at least a ten percent ownership of shares (a licensing authority can establish a higher
threshold) or the capacity to exercise “significant influence” over management by virtue of ownership
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restricted interest in the ABS will not interfere with the regulatory
objectives of the LSA or the duties of the entity and any authorized
50
person it employs to comply with their regulatory duties. Reserved
activities must be carried on within the entity only through people
51
authorized to perform those activities. There must be at least one
manager who is authorized to engage in the reserved activities for which
52
the ABS is licensed. Unauthorized persons—owners, managers,
employees—are subject to the regulation of the licensing body and
obligated to refrain from dong anything that might cause the licensed
body or the authorized persons within it to violate their professional
53
duties. An ABS is required to have a Head of Legal Practice, approved
54
by the licensing authority. That individual serves as a compliance officer
responsible for ensuring that only authorized persons carry out reserved
activities and that unauthorized persons (including owners and
managers) do not violate their duty under the Act not to cause the licensed
body or its employees and managers to breach applicable regulations. The
LSA also requires approved regulators to have systems in place to
55
protect confidentiality. The traditional privilege against disclosure of
confidential information covers any authorized provider or licensed
56
entity.
The U.K. approach foregoes none of the traditional framework of
professional regulation. It preserves all of the profession’s long-held
duties. And it preserves the capacity of the professional body to revoke
individual lawyers’ authorization to practice regardless of practice setting.
In terms of enforcement, the U.K. scheme relies on multiple
strategies in addition to license revocation. It is a criminal offense punishable
by fine or imprisonment for an entity to carry on a reserved activity through
57
someone who is not an authorized provider. Approved regulators can
also impose substantial fines: the maximum fines approved by the LSB
are £250 million for an ABS and £50 million for a manager or employee

or voting rights, either in the entity or its parent. Any change in ownership must be reported to the
licensing authority and the authority can place conditions on ownership. Id. § 20, sch. 13.
50. Individual licensing authorities can impose further restrictions on owners. For example, the
Bar Standards Board proposes to require all nonlawyer owners to also be managers. Bar Standards
Bd., Bar Standards Board Handbook r. S108 (2015).
51. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 16, sch. 11, pt. 3 (Eng. & Wales). This includes activities that
are carried out by unauthorized persons but at the direction and under the supervision of an
authorized person.
52. Id. § 16, sch. 9, pt. 2.
53. In some cases, submission to the regulatory authority is accomplished through contract. See
Bar Standards Bd., supra note 50, at r. S90.3.
54.. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 11, sch. 11, pt. 2 (Eng. & Wales).
55. Id. § 17, pt. 3.
56. Id. § 190, pt. 8.
57. Id. §§ 14–17, pt. 3.
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58

of an ABS. Regulators can disqualify individuals from serving as
59
owners or managers of an ABS. Licensing authorities are authorized to
intervene and take over management of an ABS that has violated
60
regulations when necessary to protect clients. Approved regulators
carry out annual compliance surveys and spot checks. They can also impose
61
supervision on individuals and entities, as well as conditions on licenses.
The U.K. regulatory approach also takes other steps to protect the
interests of clients. The major approved regulators require individual
62
lawyers and ABSs to hold indemnity, in essence malpractice, insurance.
Those licensed by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (the largest
licensing authority) must have client compensation funds. The LSA
establishes an Office of Legal Complaints (“OLC”), with which any
consumer can lodge a grievance. The OLC operates a Legal Ombudsman
scheme, consisting of a chief ombudsman (who must be a layperson) and
an assistant ombudsmen. Ombudsmen are authorized to resolve
complaints by remedies such as apologies, fee rebates, compensation, and
63
rectification of errors.
The U.K. approach thus substantially relaxes or eliminates the
traditional restrictions on the business models within which lawyers can
practice and the financial and managerial relationships they can enter
into with nonlawyers without sacrificing the professional values that have
so worried American judges and bar associations.
These tradeoffs—between the benefits arising from greater
competition and flexibility in business models and the risks to consumers
of failures of the quality they expect or are entitled to—are in fact an
overt part of the regulatory framework. The U.K. approach is selfconsciously risk and outcome-based; it identifies the nature of risks and
the outcomes that regulation seeks to achieve. For example, in its rules
for determining whether to approve a regulator, the LSB has set out a

58. Legal Services Act 2007, Rules on Licensing Authorities and Maximum Penalty no. 1659
(effective Aug. 2011) (Eng. & Wales).
59. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, §§ 99–100, pt. 5 (Eng. & Wales).
60. Id. § 102, sch. 14, pt. 5.
61. See, e.g., Bar Standards Bd., Licensing Authority Application 23 (2015) (regarding spot
checks and sampling to confirm compliance); Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 10(3)(b), sch. 16 (Eng.
& Wales); id. § 85, pt. 5.
62. Bar Standards Bd., supra note 50, at r. C76; Solicitors Regulation Auth., SRA Indemnity
Insurance Rules 2013 (2013); Chartered Inst. of Legal Execs., Professional Indemnity
Insurance Rules (2015); Intellectual Property Regulation Bd., Rules of Conduct for Patent
Attorneys, Trade Mark Attorneys and Other Regulated Persons r. 17 (2015); Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, Professional Indemnity Insurance Rules, at r. 3.1
(2011).
63. Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29, § 137, pt. 6 (Eng. & Wales). The value of compensation or the
cost of rectifying errors cannot together exceed £30,000. Id. § 138, pt. 6. Both respondent and
complainant are bound by the ombudsman’s resolution as final if the complainant accepts the
resolution. Id. § 140(4), pt. 6.
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chart that specifies the evidence it will be looking for to confirm that
specific principles and risks are addressed. To gain approval, the
regulators must “ensure that authorised persons must keep clients[’]
money separate from own . . . [and] must be able to compensate
clients[;]” “demonstrate how regulated persons and entities are
indemnified against losses arising from claims[;]” have a code of conduct
that “enshrines the primacy of acting in the client interest and subjugates
other pressures, be they commercial or otherwise to that principle[;]” and
“ensure that definitions of appropriate skill and competence are
64
proportionate in order to ensure both value and professionalism[.]”
The largest approved regulator, the Solicitors Regulation Authority
(“SRA”), has defined four outcomes they expect to achieve and adopted
an explicit risk framework to guide approvals for ABSs. They have
expressly stated that their approach “is in contrast to our historical rulesbased approach: we no longer focus on prescribing how those we
regulate provide services, but instead focus on the outcomes for the
65
public and consumers that result from their activities.” They focus
“attention and activity upon issues, firms and potential risks that pose the
66
greatest threat to our regulatory outcomes.” The SRA publishes
annually a Risk Outlook that reports their ongoing assessment of where
67
the risks lie.

64. Legal Servs. Bd., Rules for Applications for Approved Regulator and Qualifying
Regulator Designation pt. 2, at 18–19 (2011).
65. SRA Risk Framework, Solicitors Reg. Authority, https://www.sra.org.uk/risk/
risk-framework.page (last visited May 29, 2016).
66. Id. The attention to risk is not just hortatory: the LSB denied the Council of Licensed
Conveyancers application to become an approved regulator for litigation activities because the CLC
“failed to demonstrate an appropriate understanding of the specific risks of the new activities” and
failed to demonstrate that its proposed regulatory arrangements were outcomes focused and risk
based. “Key to this,” they noted,
the applicant needs to be able to demonstrate that they have a good understanding of the
risks and issues presented by the activities and that proposed regulatory and operational
arrangements have been designed or adapted to mitigate those risks. They need to be able
to satisfy us that they have considered the different market in which they will be operating
including (but not limited to) the types of clients that might use the new services and the
different types of businesses (e.g. size, business models, ownership, financing arrangements)
that may seek authorisation. An understanding of the risks and issues is necessary if the
applicant is to be able to be effective at targeting is authorisation, supervision and
enforcement arrangements and resources in a risk based way[.]
Legal Servs. Board, Decision Notice Issued Under Part 2 of Schedule 4 and Part 1 of Schedule
10 to the Legal Services Act 2007, at 4 (2012), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/
regulation/pdf/decisionnoticefinal.pdf.
67. The Risk Outlooks for 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 identified as priority risks: misuse of money
or assets; money laundering; bogus law firms; lack of a diverse and representative profession; failure to
provide a proper standard of service, particularly for vulnerable people; breach of confidentiality as a
result of failure of information security and cybercrime; a lack of independence due to pressure from
large clients (including corporate employers of in-house lawyers); and improper or abusive litigation.
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How well is the U.K. approach working? As one of us has
documented elsewhere, the evidence to date is promising. Both as a
result of the longstanding acceptance of the idea that useful legal help
can be provided by a variety of legal and lay professionals, and as a result
of the licensing of ABSs, the U.K. framework includes many more
options for English and Welsh consumers of legal services than the
American model. Many of these options come in the form of unbundled
services to support what in the United Kingdom is called “DIY” law and
a wide range of advisory services to help people manage legal questions
68
and issues that have not turned into lawsuits (yet). Total revenues in the
69
legal sector increased eighteen percent between 2010 and 2014. There
has been no loss of employment for lawyers. The number of practicing
solicitors increased 2.3% from May 2014 to May 2015, and the number of
vacancies advertised for law firms increased forty-eight percent in 2014.
There has been substantial consolidation of practice, with the percentage
of solo practitioners falling from forty-six to thirty-nine percent, and the
percentage of firms with two to four partners growing from forty-one to
70
forty-six percent between 2008 and 2011. As of 2013, ABSs were more
likely than other practice entities to use technology: ninety-one percent
reported having a website to deliver information and services, compared
71
to fifty-two percent of solicitor firms using a website for advertising.
72
Overall, ABSs showed higher productivity and innovation and were
statistically more likely to have seen an increase in revenues (fifty-seven
73
percent compared to forty-nine percent). A 2015 study found that ABSs
were thirteen percent to fifteen percent more likely to introduce new
legal services and that twenty-five percent of all legal services providers
had introduced a new or improved service in the three years following
the introduction of ABS licensing. In short, “the major effect of
innovation in legal services has been to extend service range, improve
74
quality and attract new clients.”
Consumers are clearly benefitting from the U.K. changes. Although
we lack systematic studies of the impact of changes on pricing, it is clear
that the U.K. environment offers much more flat fee pricing than the

Solicitors Reg. Auth., SRA Risk Outlook 2014/15 (2014) [hereinafter Solicitors Reg. Auth., SRA
Risk Outlook 2014/15]; Solicitors Reg. Auth., SRA Risk Outlook 2015/16 (2015).
68. Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 11, at 43; Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access,
supra note 1.
69. Legal Servs. Bd., Strategy 2015, at 18 (2015).
70. Legal Servs. Bd., Market Impact of the Legal Services Act 82 (2012).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 80.
73. Legal Servs. Bd., Evaluation: Changes in Competition in Different Legal Markets: An
Empirical Analysis 6 (2013).
74. Enter. Research Ctr., Innovation in Legal Services: A Report for the Solicitors
Regulation Authority and the Legal Services Board 4 (2015).

G - Hadfield_Rhode_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

June 2016]

HOW TO REGULATE LEGAL SERVICES

6/19/2016 12:09 PM

1213

U.S. environment—a pricing model that supports increased access by
reducing uncertainty and risk and promoting transparent choices among
providers. In 2014, 46% of consumers reported paying a fixed fee for
75
services, up from 38% in 2012. Moreover, there are clear improvements
in choice and perceptions of value, with the greatest gains in family law.
The percentage of fixed fees in this area increased from 12% in 2012 to
45% in 2014. Between 2011 and 2014 the percentage of consumers saying
they shopped around for services increased from 21% to 41%, and the
perception that they had received value for their money increased from
76
50% to 62%.
There is no evidence of a flood of problems along lines that American
commentators have raised. The SRA Risk Outlook for 2014/2015 indicates,
for example, that dangers that the SRA in previous years had identified
as possible risks—a lack of due diligence over outsourcing arrangements
and a lack of transparency in complex alternative business structures—
77
had failed to materialize. The rate of errors by unregulated will
providers, while substantial, was equivalent to that of regulated solicitors,
which led the government to reject a proposal to make will writing a
78
reserved activity. Law firms with nonsolicitor managers and partners,
known as Legal Disciplinary Partnerships (“LDPs”), generated fewer
complaints on a revenue adjusted basis than solicitor-only firms from
2011 to 2013. ABSs resolved a higher percentage of complaints received
79
than solicitor firms (93% compared to 83%). Although these are still
early days, if anything the call has been for further loosening of
restrictions to prompt even greater innovation and improvements for
80
consumers.

75. Legal Servs. Consumer Panel, Tracker Survey 2014 Briefing Note: A Changing Market
4 (2014) (“The five areas where fixed fees are most common are: will-writing (71%); power of attorney
(65%); conveyancing (66%); immigration (55%); and family (45%).”).
76. Id. Across all categories, choice satisfaction increased from 65% to 68%; shopping around
increased from 21% to 23%; those finding it difficult to compare providers dropped from 28% to 14%;
those using the same lawyer as before dropped from 25% to 21%/ and those perceiving value for their
money increased from 57% to 63%. Id. at 1.
77. Solicitors Reg. Auth., SRA Risk Outlook 2014/2015, supra note 67, at 8.
78. Legal Servs. Consumer Panel, Regulating Will-Writing 20–22 (2011) (discussing the rate
of errors); Legal Servs. Bd., Final Reports: Sections 24 and 26 Investigations: Will-Writing,
Estate Administration and Probate Activities (2013) (proposing to make will-writing a reserved
activity); U.K. Ministry of Justice, Decision Notice Re: Extension of the Reserved Legal
Activities (May 14, 2013) (rejecting recommendation to make will writing a reserved activity).
79. Legal Servs. Bd., Evaluation: Changes in Competition in Different Legal Markets 77–78
(2013). The SRA allowed solicitors to form Legal Disciplinary Partnerships with nonsolicitor owners
who were also managers and partners beginning in 2009; these converted to ABS licenses (which
allows approved nonlawyer owners who are not also managers or partners) in 2012 when ABS
licensing first became available. Id.
80. See, e.g., Press Release, Legal Servs. Bd., The Case for Change: Legislative Options Beyond
the Legal Services Act 2007 (July 27, 2015) (on file with authors); see also Stephen Mayson, The Legal
Services Act: What Might Replace It and When? Stephen Mayson: An Indep. Mind (Apr. 1, 2015),
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IV. American Options
The U.K. regulatory scheme, which balances the need to promote
innovation, quality improvements, and cost reductions against the
potential for harm to consumers, has clear advantages over the approach
in the United States. American unauthorized practice enforcement is not
81
dependent on actual client harm. Nor do American discussions of
regulatory reform rest on evidence of probabilities and harms. In a
recent discussion, for example, one opponent of regulatory change told
an ABA Commission that all legal services raise tremendous risks for
82
clients that only licensed attorneys can manage. No evidence was cited
and our previous discussion suggests why.
The need to guard against the way in which professional self-interest
can cloud assessment of the public interest is a central feature of the U.K.
approach. It ensures that regulatory bodies have lay chairs and a majority
of lay members who are not the subjects of regulation. Acknowledgement of
even sincere confusion between professional and public interest is also a
central feature of American antitrust law. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently recognized that when the state delegates regulatory power to
active market participants, as state supreme courts do,
ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in a
way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual allegiances
are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active market

http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/upload/mayson-2015-lsawhat-might-replace-it-final.pdf; Richard Moriarty, Innovation and Legal Services Regulation at
Westminster Legal Policy Forum (July 9, 2015); Sir Michael Pitt, The Future of Legal Services
Regulation at Westminster Legal Policy Forum (September 4, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/speeches_presentations/index.htm).
81. Rhode & Ricca, supra note 18, at 2604.
82. Larry Fox, Submission to ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services (July 2015).
Even the most routine divorce can and will cascade out of control. . . . All clients,
particularly the poor, deserve real lawyer supervision, responsibility and control for all that
is undertaken on their behalf. And that is because the only routine surgery is surgery that is
being performed on someone else, and only a full-fledged lawyer will be able to identify
when it is that the legal services required are anything but routine.
Id. (emphasis added). Fox’s approach rejects the very idea that risks vary across settings or that it can
be possible to identify higher risk cases and divert those that need higher-level services to avoid bad
outcomes into that appropriate level without sending all into high-cost solutions. There is after all a
category of routine surgery and not all surgery calls for or is conducted by a specialist. And indeed
much of health care is not surgery but routine treatment of routine medical needs. The medical
profession relies heavily on non-MD professionals such as nurse practitioners, certified nurse
anesthetists, pharmacists, and physical therapists to appropriately allocate expensive MD services
where they are needed and reduce the cost of routine care. Fox offers no answer to the point that it is
simply not possible, even with massive increases to legal aid and pro bono, to provide the millions of
people who currently get no help on these important matters with services from “full-fledged” lawyers.
Nor does he identify any evidence to suggest that this is necessary.
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participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from
83
antitrust accountability.

In what may be a new era for antitrust enforcement of self-regulated
84
professions, bar associations and state supreme courts must ensure that
their regulation of lawyers is based on systematic attention to real, not
imagined, risks, and that those risks are appropriately balanced against
the costs of regulations that raise costs, inhibit innovation, and fail
85
adequately to protect consumers. The evidence from the United Kingdom
demonstrates that relaxation of many American restrictions on practice
poses little risk and significant gains for the public.
As we have argued elsewhere, the four changes to regulation needed to
improve access, reduce costs, promote innovation and improve quality are:
(1) to develop a licensing scheme under which entities in addition to
lawyer-only law firms are authorized to provide legal services; (2) to
relax rules on the contractual relationships possible between lawyers and
nonlawyers to allow revenue and profit sharing; (3) to expand the
number and diversity of licensed legal professions; and (4) to allow some
legal help to be provided by licensed nonlawyer experts or by lay

83. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015). The Court expressly
notes that the concerns extend to legal professional regulation. Id. (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)) (noting the fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its
members).
84. LegalZoom, for example, filed an antitrust suit against the North Carolina Bar in 2015,
shortly after the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners case, alleging antitrust violations arising
from the Bar’s refusal to register its legal aid plans. Complaint at *3−4, Legalzoom.com, Inc., v. N.C.
State Bar, 2015 WL 3499887 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 439).
85. Bar association leaders are hardly circumspect about the extent to which their regulatory
actions are responsive to the interests of lawyers. In testimony before the ABA’s Ethics 20/20
Commission, the chief deputy counsel in Colorado’s office of attorney regulation maintained that a
Colorado open-border policy, allowing attorneys licensed in other states to practice in Colorado up to
the point of litigation, as long as they do not become domiciled there or open an office, has “worked
well.” Former ABA president Carolyn Lamm responded that advocating such an approach would
impair the Commission’s credibility and would “not go over in the ABA House of Delegates.” Joan C.
Rogers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Gets Earful About Its Draft Proposals on Foreign Lawyers, MJP,
27 Law. Manual Prof’l Conduct 669, 671 (2011) (quoting James Coyle and paraphrasing Carolyn
Lamm). That objection underscores the problems of vesting so much authority over regulatory policy
in the organized bar, which is anything but disinterested concerning issues affecting professional
competition. Similarly, efforts by the 20/20 Commission to develop proposals for relaxed rules on
nonlawyer participation in law firms was squelched by, among other things, opposition from the New
York State Bar Association based on a survey of its members and the discovery that there was little
demand among lawyers for change. For a discussion and citations, see Hadfield, The Cost of Law,
supra note 1. We also note that Larry Fox has been unabashed in his comments to the ABA’s
Commission for the Future of Legal Services about the fact that he sees the significant commercial
threat to lawyers—and corporate law firms like the one at which he practices—as a basis for putting
the brakes on the Commission’s reform agenda. He titles his submission to the Commission “A
Message from the Legal Profession: SOS.” Mr. Fox also subsequently sent to the Commission an email containing a link to a story about how accounting firms are making inroads into corporate M&A
work in Australia under Australia’s U.K.-style approach to regulation with the subject line “Help!”
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individuals subject to ordinary protections of the market supplied by
86
consumer protection, contract, and tort law.
While we believe that the ideal reforms would follow the British
model and establish specific legal activities that require licensing, leaving
the residual to the ordinary protections of the market, we recognize that
such a shift is only likely to be acceptable in the United States on the
basis of evidence that these protections achieve acceptable outcomes for
American consumers. Although the U.K. evidence here is very
promising, we realize that the American marketplace may differ from the
U.K. marketplace, which has a long tradition of nonlawyer-based legal
87
advice and assistance. In the United States, a wait-and-see approach
that seeks to test the impact of relaxed constraints on the scope of
authorized practice is consistent with the prudent outcomes- and riskbased approach to regulation that we advocate. Similarly, although we
also think it would be ideal to have multiple separately regulated
professional bodies, allowing a form of interprofessional regulatory
competition as there is in the United Kingdom, this too seems like
something that would need to emerge over time in a changed regulatory
landscape in the United States.
For these reasons, we focus our discussion of American options on
the development of a licensing regime in which attorneys have more
flexible relationships with nonlawyers and legal services entities are able
to operate at national scale. We propose that such a regime begin with a
clear statement of guiding principles. These should include promotion of
access to legal services through cost reduction and innovation as well as
the observance of lawyers’ traditional professional duties: competence,
loyalty, independence, confidentiality, the avoidance of conflicts of
interest, and the obligation to uphold the rule of law and the impartial
administration of justice. An appropriate registration and licensing regime
should then focus on identifying specific risks and balancing prescriptive
rules with performance-based oversight. Regulatory enforcement should
focus on cases in which risks have in fact materialized. Oversight should
rest with independent regulators who have sufficient accountability to
the state and public interest to satisfy the requirements of active state
supervision and avoidance of anticompetitive conduct by practicing

86. See Rhode, The Trouble with Lawyers, supra note 1, at 40−51; Hadfield, The Cost of Law,
supra note 1; Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access, supra note 1.
87. The U.K. history of nonlawyer legal services also developed within the framework of
extensive legal aid. Many of those providing such services have done so through publicly funded legal
help centers or were paid for by government. Because of public funding, these providers have been
under some government oversight, if only on the basis of maintaining their eligibility for and success in
obtaining legal aid contracts. For evidence that nonlawyer legal services have provided high quality
assistance in the United Kingdom in the context of legal aid, see Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting
Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 765 (2003).
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attorneys. The discussion below offers greater detail on how such a
system might operate in practice. But first we address a major challenge
in the American context: supporting the operation of entities and legal
practices at national scale in light of the constraints of federalism and the
long history of state-by-state regulation of lawyering.
In order to achieve national scale, entities ideally should have a
single regulator. With fifty different regulators, the barriers to entry are
significant, particularly in light of the way in which professional
regulation is now conducted through bar committees that operate with
88
little transparency and little active supervision from state courts. One
obvious route to a single regulator is for Congress to create a national
licensing authority, exercising authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate interstate commerce. Proposals for a national bar exam and
system of admission are not new—state-by-state licensing has been a
longstanding barrier to mobility and national practice for attorneys. Prior
objections to a centralized governance scheme have included concerns
that federal licensing of attorneys is inconsistent with state courts’
inherent regulatory power and that the federal bureaucracy necessary to
administer the system would be vulnerable to political capture and would
89
pose an undue risk to the independence of the profession.
A federal licensing authority for entities, however, need not entirely
displace existing state-by-state bar admissions and regulation of
attorneys. As we have seen with the U.K. example, the introduction of
entity licensing need not terminate judicial control and discipline of
lawyers. Nor need it displace professional control over education, bar
admissions, and lawyer discipline. Licensing and regulation of ABSs in
the United Kingdom is layered on top of lawyer licensing and regulation.
Federal licensing of such entities in the United States could obligate
entities to ensure that legal services are supplied in a manner that is
consistent with professional principles, and could require that legal work
be conducted under the responsible oversight of licensed attorneys.
Failure to abide by these requirements would result in enforcement
against the entity: criminal proceedings, fines, suspension, or revocation

88. Although formal enforcement processes such as disciplinary proceedings against a licensed
attorney and criminal proceedings against those charged with unauthorized practice are carried out
with state court participation, most regulatory oversight and intervention is carried out by bar
committees composed entirely of practicing attorneys who open investigations and send out warnings
or cease and desist letters without state court oversight or who refuse to register legal aid plans. See
generally Complaint, Legalzoom.com, Inc., v. N.C. State Bar, 2015 WL 3499887 (M.D.N.C. June 3,
2015) (No. 15 Civ. 439). These are the practices found anticompetitive in the North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners case. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
89. See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional
Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 665, 706 (1995); see also Anthony
E. Davis, Multijurisdictional Practice by Transactional LawyersWhy the Sky Really Is Falling, Prof.
Law., Winter 2000, at 1359.
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of the entity’s license, for example. Entities could be required to hold
minimum levels of malpractice insurance, establish compensation funds,
and cooperate with remedial orders emerging from an independent
complaints resolution process (along the lines of the U.K. Legal
Ombudsman).
The only substantial modification to state-by-state professional rules
of conduct that would be required in such a regime would be
authorization for state-licensed attorneys to practice within or with a
90
licensed entity. This would mean modifying the rules that currently
make it professional misconduct for an attorney to be an employee of an
entity providing legal services to the public or to be in a revenue-sharing
arrangement with an entity. State regulators could continue to prohibit
any employment or fee-sharing relationships with unlicensed entities. All
other professional duties imposed by state regulators on attorneys could
remain in place: competence, the avoidance of conflicts of interest,
loyalty to the client, independence and upholding duties to courts, and
the fair administration of justice. Attorneys would still be subject to
state-based discipline including suspension and revocation of a license
for misconduct. Attorneys would still be required to meet state-based
standards for admission to the bar. State courts would continue to
determine who could appear before them.
Specific concerns about the impact of federal licensing on the
independence of state-licensed attorneys and the inherent authority of
state supreme courts to oversee the administration of justice in their
states could be addressed with appropriate provisions in the federal
licensing law or state statutes or court rules. For example, as with the
U.K. regime, the client’s privilege against the disclosure of confidential
communications could be expressly extended through federal and state
rules in order to cover communications shared between the attorney and
the employees of a licensed entity. Express obligations on entity
personnel not to interfere with the exercise of independence by attorneys
with whom they work could be written into the federal licensing law—as
they are in the U.K. Legal Services Act—and enforced with the threat of
license revocation.
To facilitate a federal entity licensing regime, state laws prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law by corporate entities might have to be

90. Depending on the business model pursued by the licensed entity, other changes might be
needed to ensure that attorneys working with and within licensed entities are not at risk of violating
state professional conduct rules. For example, bar associations sometimes suggest that lawyers who
participate in websites that review or rate lawyers or who are identified as specialists are in violation of
bar rules about advertising. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion 972 (June
26, 2013); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Opinion 09-10 (Mar. 22, 2010). Other possible changes
include allowing attorneys to practice under a firm name other than a personal name and permitting
licensed entities to direct work to a particular (appropriate) lawyer to perform services.
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amended to allow a valid entity license to be recognized as a complete
defense to prosecution. Alternatively, we can imagine that courts would
be bound to recognize federal preemption of state law as applied to
licensed entities. State prosecutors could still pursue charges against
unlicensed entities and individuals engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law, although they should be required to have evidence of public
91
harm. In effect, such a federal licensing scheme would leave in place
existing state-based attorney regulation and unauthorized practices rules
but create a safe harbor for entity practice.
An important advantage of federal licensing of entities is that a
federal regulatory authority could achieve the independence from
practicing attorneys necessary to ensure that oversight develops in the
public interest and with protection of consumers as the primary
consideration. Moreover, a fresh start on regulation makes it much more
likely that a new regulatory authority could follow the U.K. model and
adopt an outcomes- and risk-based approach to regulation that uses the
data collection advantages of national scale to ensure that regulation is
evidence based. Funding for a federal agency can also draw on license
fees levied on regulated entities based on nationwide revenues. The
United Kingdom’s Solicitors Regulatory Authority, for example, in
addition to collecting dues from solicitors, imposes licensing fees that
92
scale with revenues. For an entity such as LegalZoom, with U.S.
revenues thought to be on the order of $200 million, licensing fees at
93
comparable rates would amount to about $350,000. For entities hitting
the billion-dollar mark, as the largest U.S. corporate law firms do, the fee
to become a licensed entity on a nationwide scale would approximate
$1.5 million.
An alternative to a federal licensing body would be a cooperative
regime between state regulators. This could take one of two forms. One
possibility is the creation of a joint licensing authority among the fifty
states. Individual state supreme courts could delegate the power to
license and oversee entities to this joint agency. This approach, like the
federal approach, retains the attractions of a single dedicated regulator
and the potential for a fresh, independently funded and managed
regulatory regime. State courts would, however, retain ultimate authority
to revoke the power of the joint agency to license entities to practice in
their state in the event that the agency failed to meet state standards.

91. See Rhode & Ricca, supra note 18, at 2597−99.
92. Fee Policy 2014/2015, Solicitors Reg. Authority (June 26, 2014), http://www.sra.org.uk/mysra/
fees/fee-policy-2014-2015.page.
93. Michael Carney, The $425M Legalzoom Deal Is a Win for VCs, but Less Exciting for the
Company or LA, Pando (Jan. 6, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/01/06/the-legalzoom-deal-is-a-win-forvcs-but-less-exciting-for-the-company-or-la/.
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A second, but in our view inferior, possibility that does not involve
federal legislation is the establishment of a national board for the
development of uniform entity licensing standards and practices.
Individual state supreme courts could then provide in their own rules
requiring that compliance with the national standards and practices will
meet state standards. Alternatively, on the model of drivers’ licenses,
states could recognize as valid entity licenses obtained in any state that
met national standards. This is the approach followed in Australia for
attorney licensing. There, lawyers are admitted by a state or territory, but
under uniform standards, so that their admission is recognized
94
nationally. A drawback of this approach is that the burden of actual
licensing and oversight would still fall on the states. In addition, as a
practical matter, state supreme courts—heavily burdened with
overwhelming caseloads and inadequate budgets—would still face the
pressure they experience today to delegate substantial regulatory power
to bar associations. That means that despite common nationwide
standards, licensed entities could face the risk that the application and
enforcement of standards would diverge across states and lack
transparency. Such an approach might well fail to produce a single set of
nationwide standards for entity practice.
The creation of a national entity licensing authority, whether as a
creature of federal law or of cooperation among the state supreme courts
in their rulemaking capacity, also holds out the potential for other
regulatory reforms, beyond entity regulation, that can improve access,
promote innovation, and improve the quality of lawyering. We noted
earlier that a narrowing in the scope of legal practice for which a license
is required in the first place—along the lines of what is permissible in the
United Kingdom for example—would be likely to emerge in the United
States only on the basis of evidence about actual risks of poor outcomes
for consumers. A national licensing authority could move that process
along by undertaking to license providers of designated likely low-risk
activities. The national authority could then monitor performance in
these market segments: collecting data on prices, serving as a central
complaints office, auditing performance to assess the incidence of errors,
for example. Licenses could be revoked on the basis of evidence that a
provider has fallen beneath acceptable standards. Again, a major
advantage of this approach is the capacity to collect evidence on a
national scale in order to develop outcomes and risk-based regulation
that appropriately balances the goals of access, innovation, and
competition against legitimate concerns for client protection. Regulators,
state and national, would then be able to determine which activities

94. Murray Hawkins, Questions and Answers Australian Legal Education and Bar Admissions,
77 Bar Examiner 11, 18 (2008).
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really do impose low risks of generating problems, and where
enforcement resources should focus on to prevent the truly serious risks.
The “notario” scams that haunt state regulators now merit close
95
attention; the development of online advice platforms for routine legal
questions may not.
In 2015, Washington State took the first steps toward such a licensing
framework by recognizing limited license legal technicians (“LLLTs”).
The program, adopted after twelve years of study, will enable graduates
96
to handle out-of-court family matters without a lawyer’s supervision.
Although only fifteen individuals were in the initial class, the program
has already attracted considerable attention. In 2014, the ABA Task
Force on the Future of Legal Education released a report calling for
limited licensing and the expansion of training programs for such
97
practitioners by law schools. California and Oregon are considering
98
such proposals. New York has adopted a pilot program that allows
trained nonlawyer “navigators” in specific locations in the Brooklyn
Housing Court and Bronx civil court to answer questions by the trial
judge and assist pro se litigants in preparing papers and negotiating
99
settlements. A major virtue of limited licenses is that they can promise
to provide higher quality, due to specialization, than that provided by
100
general practitioners.
The Washington State experience, however, also speaks to the
challenge of developing alternative licenses that promote access to
justice within the framework of our existing state supreme court-based
system of regulation. First, there is the reality that state supreme courts
are already overburdened and lack the policymaking and regulatory
oversight resources necessary to develop brand new regulatory regimes.
Given this reality, the Washington State Supreme Court, which ordered

95.. Amy Yarbrough, Limited-Practice License Idea Faces Challenging Path, Cal. B.J. (May 2013),
http://www.calbarjournal.com/May2013/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx.
96. Stephen R. Crossland & Paula C. Littlewood, The Washington State Limited License Legal
Technician Program: Enhancing Access to Justice and Ensuring the Integrity of the Legal Profession,
65 S.C. L. Rev. 611, 612 (2014); Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal
Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 Supra 75, 90–92 (2013).
97. Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on the Future of Legal Educ., Report and Recommendations
3, 24–25 (2014).
98. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”?:
Implications for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C. L. Rev. 579, 591–92 (2014); Legal Technicians Task
Force, Final Report to the Board of Governors (Feb. 13, 2015).
99. Jonathan Lippman, The State of the Judiciary 2014: Vision and Action in Our Modern Courts,
N.Y. St. Unified Ct. Sys. 8 (2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/2014-SOJ.pdf.
100. See Moorhead et al., supra note 87. As Andrew Perlman notes, the LLLT licensing process is
“arguably a greater guarantee of competence than the training most law students receive. After all,
lawyers are permitted to practice in any area once they obtain a license, even if they have never had
any formal training in the subject.” Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services,
37 Cardozo L. Rev. 49, 110–11 (2015).
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the creation of the LLLT scheme, chose to vest responsibility for its
development with an independent board, responsible to the court,
composed of volunteers, a majority of whom are lawyer members of the
Washington State Bar Association. Staffing is provided by the bar
association. This has arguably led to the reproduction of the
shortcomings of existing professional regulation—an overreliance on
prescriptive rules, with little in the way of evidence regarding the
relationship between requirements and outcomes. In addition, the
dominance of lawyer-members on the governing board generated an
inherent conflict of interest: asking one set of professionals—licensed
J.D.s—to develop and oversee a regime for professionals they see as
their competitors. The Washington program came into being only by
order of the Washington State Supreme Court over opposition from the
101
Washington State Bar Association. The LLLT Board adopted stringent
102
Whether these qualifications and other practice
qualifications.
requirements will discourage large numbers of applicants, and thus prevent
robust price competition or inhibit significant efficiency gains, it is too
soon to tell.
The development of a new national regulatory authority for entity
licensing could, however, offer a path to the development of a more
robust licensing alternative. One straightforward advantage is the
economies of scale inherent in the development of a single set of
requirements at a national level. Individual states could then determine
whether to recognize these licenses. Furthermore, the development of
alternative professional licensing categories could emerge on the basis of
actual evidence developed from entity oversight regulation. The great
promise of expanded professional licensing, we believe, lies not in
licensing individuals who then are required to practice within the

101. The Washington Bar Association opposed the LLLT program, citing concerns that it would
institutionalize “second class, separate but unequal, justice” and “take work away from young, rural,
and less affluent lawyers.” Holland, supra note 96, at 75 (quoting Washington Board of Governors).
The chair of its Family Law Section claimed that legal technicians would lack the “competency to
actually do for the poor what needs to be done. Just because you’re poor doesn’t mean your legal
problems are simple.” Robert Ambrogi, Authorized Practice, 101 A.B.A. J. 72 (2015) (quoting Ruth
Laura Edlund). California’s consideration of a licensing program has drawn similarly harsh criticism
from practitioners. One commentator said she was “astonished that [the bar] would consider actions
that would be detrimental to the honest attorneys who are trying to make a living in California.”
Samson Habte, California and Oregon Task Forces Endorse Licensing of Nonlawyer “Legal
Technicians,” 31 Law. Manual Prof. Conduct 164 (2015).
102. The Board’s responsibilities are set forth in Washington Courts, Limited Practice Rule for
Limited License Legal Technicians, at r. 28C(2) (effective Sept. 3, 2013). Admission requirements
include an associate’s degree, forty-five core credits of paralegal instruction, fifteen “practice area”
credits developed in collaboration with an ABA-approved law school, and 3000 hours of lawyersupervised experience, as well as passage of core and practice area exams. Id. at r. 28(D)–(E); id. at
r. 28 app. Reg. 3. LLLTs must also satisfy character and fitness requirements and carry liability
insurance. Id. at r. 28(D)(2); id. at r. 28 app. Reg. 12.
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inefficient business model of solo and small-firm lawyer practitioners, but
rather in the development of specialized skills deployed within a larger
organization. This is the model within which the multiple professionals in
health care operate: as members of a broad-based health care team
coordinated within a hospital or health care organization. That is,
additional specialized and limited legal licenses make sense within the
broader context of entity regulation. Within that framework and within
those entities, many of the concerns lawyers now voice about alternative
practitioners can be met much more effectively. The quality of practice
by alternative practitioners operating on teams within an entity can be
monitored both by the entity—which is able to implement protocols and
internal oversight mechanisms—and by the entity regulator—which has
the ability to fine or revoke the license of an entity that fails to
appropriately supervise those operating under a limited license. Our
hope, then, would be that establishing a national licensing authority—
whether under federal law or as a result of joint action by state supreme
courts and legislatures—would lay the groundwork for an informed
development of alternative licensing frameworks.
Conclusion
As scholars who have long advocated fundamental reform in the
delivery of legal services and the regulation of the legal profession, we
are not naïve about the political obstacles that stand in the way. But we
are hopeful that recent changes in the conditions of practice and the
examples from other nations can serve as a catalyst for rethinking
current frameworks. Only through a substantial reconstruction of our
regulatory approaches can we begin to make access to justice less of an
aspiration than a reality.
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